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COMMENTARY
In this comment I will define question begging in the most general sense. For
some reason, perhaps because of the purpose for giving the argument, a class of
statements has been specified as the class to be argued from. A question begging premise
is one that is not in that class and hasn’t been derived from statements that are in that
class. In other words, you are arguing from a premise you’re not supposed to be arguing
from.
Question begging consists in arguing from a premise you’re not supposed to be
arguing from. It is a fault in your argument. A broad usage calls faults in arguments
“fallacies.” However I prefer to call them faults and to speak of fallacy only when the
faulty argument appears not to be faulty. I have said elsewhere that every real fallacy is a
fallacy of ambiguity. 1 Question begging itself is a fault but not yet a fallacy. Still, there is
a phenomenon of question begging, and, indeed, by taking different ideas of what
statements we should argue from, there are several different kinds or ideas of question
begging.
Now in these comments I wish to pursue further the task set by Professor Ritola in
his paper, using mostly ideas from previous papers of mine. 2 Professor Ritola’s ideas are
I think going in the right directions, but I think I can get a bit further. The task is to look
at cases of so-called irresolvable conflict and to ask: Is there really any interesting kind of
question begging going on in those cases, and, if so, how can it be characterized? The
cases are those like the Ann and Bob case. This is a simple minded version of the free
will determinism problem. Ann argues: Determinism, therefore no free will. Bob argues:
Free will, therefore not determinism, and then they accuse each other of question
begging. Ritola remarks that it is difficult to specify an interesting kind of question
begging going on in this case. I shall argue that this is because there is no question
begging in any interesting sense in this case. Later on, I shall relent a bit and admit that,
so to speak, there may be question begging of a sort going on nearby, though not quite
where we’re looking.
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The Ann and Bob dispute is a philosophical dispute. My teacher Hector
Castaneda used to say that philosophy is a first person business. The argument is not
really between Ann and Bob. It is between Ann and Ann, and between Bob and Bob, and
me and myself, and you and yourself.
We all secretly believe that whatever happens must have a cause and that
determinism is true. And we all secretly believe that we are responsible for our actions
and have free will. And we secretly believe, upon the least reflection, that if determinism
is true, we cannot possibly have free will. So we believe three statements which form an
inconsistent triad.
So if anyone should choose any two of those three and use them as premises
against the third, no one is in any position to claim that those premises are question
begging. If I ask myself, where did the arguer’s premises come from, I reply, they came
from ME.
To get clearer about what is really going on in the Ann and Bob case, we would
need clarity about the free will determinism problem itself. But, since I am not going to
solve that problem today, I turn to a case where we know the solution even though the
debaters do not.
Long ago, in ancient Greece, there was a fallacy. If A and not A, there is a true
contradiction, and if there is change, then, for some A, there is A and then not A. So, it
was concluded, if there is change, there are true contradictions.
Now we know this argument is a fallacy. As Aristotle later pointed out: A and not
A in the first premise is really a contradiction, but in the second premise it’s just A now
and not A later. Yet at a time before Aristotle there were, let us imagine, two
philosophers who bought this fallacy hook, line and sinker and thought it self-evident that
if there is change there are true contradictions. And let us dub these philosophers
Heraclitus and Parmenides. So Heraclitus argued: If there is change there are true
contradictions. But there is change, so there are true contradictions. And Parmenides
argued: If there is change there are true contradictions. But no contradiction can be true,
so there can’t be any change. And on hearing each other’s argument, they repeated their
own more loudly. And then more loudly still. And then, they accused each other of
begging the question.
“You, Heraclitus, are begging the question. You keep assuming that there is
change—the very thing that I deny.”
“No. You, Parmenides, are begging the question. You keep assuming there are no
true contradictions, but I am saying there are.”
So they accuse each other of begging the question. But are they really? I don’t
think so.
Parmenides’s premise is that no contradiction can be true. It is hard to believe that
a premise stating the very basis of logic could be a logical flaw in an argument. This
premise is self-evidently true. Aristotle says in the Prior Analytics 3 that a premise that is
self-evident cannot be question begging, because it cannot be in doubt and cannot really
be in question.
Nor does Heraclitus’s premise seem question begging. This says there is change.
But surely that fact is obviously true and not in doubt.
3
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It will be complained that here I employ too logical an idea of question begging,
where we are supposed to argue from premises that are self-evident or obviously true
(Ritola calls this the objective epistemic idea). No doubt we need a more dialectical idea,
where we argue from the beliefs of an audience or an opponent.
But not too dialectical, or it will be uninteresting. As Ritola remarks, if
Parmenides uses a premise which is self-evidently true and if Heraclitus is fool enough to
deny that premise, how can that be counted as a fault on Parmenides’s side?
Suppose I step into a room and see the murderer repeatedly plunging the knife
into the victim, and with much blood everywhere, the victim dies. I say, “You’ve
murdered him!”
The murderer says very calmly, “No, I didn’t.”
I say, “Of course, you did!”
The murderer says, “Now, you’re just begging the question.” Surely this idea of
question begging is one only a murderer could love. Or someone guilty of a flagrant
misdeed.
Nor is it easy to see dialectical question begging here in any serious sense.
Parmenides says that no contradiction can be true. Heraclitus’s only objection seems to
be that the premise is contradictory with his, Heraclitus’s, conclusion. But if Heraclitus
employs the Law of Non-Contradiction to object to that premise, how can that premise
which is the Law of Non-Contradiction be question begging against such a Heraclitus?
Or if Heraclitus has the courage of his convictions and embraces the premise, so
that the premise plus his own conclusion form another fine example of a true
contradiction, how can the premise be question begging against a Heraclitus who
embraces it?
Nor is it easy to believe that Heraclitus’s premise that there is change is really
question begging against Parmenides. For though Parmenides purports to believe that
change is impossible, he keeps trying to change Heraclitus’s mind on this point. And,
anyway, how did Parmenides bring himself to attempt and to perform the impossible task
of dressing himself in the morning?
There is no question begging in this case!
Now I relent a bit.
In an earlier paper 4 I argued much as here and said that philosophers never beg
the question. But then I said rather oddly that whoever accuses his opponent of begging
the question is himself begging the question!
And I am bothered by Aristotle’s remark that a self-evident statement cannot be
doubted. In past papers 5 I said that in metaphilosophy we need two epistemologies,
epistemology 1 and epistemology 2.
Imagine some debaters, philosophers, are having a debate and they are confused
about the true logic of their issues. But we are the all-knowing outside observers. We
know what really follows from what and what really is a good reason for what. The
evaluation of this is Epistemology 1. However the debaters are seeking this knowledge.
They only have appearances of the true logic and they must argue as best they can from
the balancing of those appearances. The evaluation of this is Epistemology 2.
4
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If S is self-evident, it is indubitable 1. Suppose there is an argument appearing to
prove not S. Then that argument contains a hidden fallacy, since not S is self-evidently
false. The argument appears to give a reason for not S, but really it’s a worthless fallacy.
No real reason can exist for thinking not S or doubting S.
But Epistemology 2 sees it differently. To the debater, S appears to be selfevident—self-evident 1—but the argument appears to prove not S. So both S and the
argument must be doubted. The appearance of proof is a reason—a prima facie reason
2—for believing there is a proof and that the conclusion is true. So S can be doubted.
Now to see how and where there may be question begging in our cases, let us call
our two debaters H and P and let us put H and P through three stages of discussion
envisaged in my metaphilosophy. 6 In Stage I, H argues that there are true contradictions,
P that there is no change. Epistemology 1 states its view. The first premise of their
arguments says that change implies contradiction. This is absurd and no reason could
justify it. The supposed reason about A and not A is a worthless fallacy. H’s second
premise is obvious, P’s self-evident. Neither can be doubted. The conclusions follow but
since the first premise is absurd, there is no proof. Anyway both conclusions are absurd
and there could be no reason to believe either.
So Epistemology 1 states part of the very truth the philosophers are yearning for,
but it has a very low opinion of philosophers.
Epistemology 2 says the first premise appears to be self-evident to both debaters
and no one puts up any point against it. So, although actually false, it is dialectically
established—by the positive weight of appearance in its favor.
The second premises appear obvious or self-evident, but they appear to be in
direct conflict, so there is no clear balance either for or against either. Nothing is
established either way.
Each conclusion appears to be proven—proven 1, but neither is established, since
the arguments are in conflict and anyway, the second premises aren’t established. So, in
sum, the first premise only is established dialectically, or established 2.
At Discussion Phase 2, each debater is supposed to explain, by citing fallacies, the
apparent goodness of his opponent’s bad argument. The true explanation is the fallacy
behind the first premise, but each debater is too busy committing this fallacy himself and
is in no position to point it out. So H, say, must find some fallacy, some ambiguity,
explaining why P’s false second premise appears self-evidently true. Unfortunately, H’s
theory has no relevant distinction or pseudo-distinction in it and he has nothing to say. He
can’t do his dialectical duty. Neither can P. This and not question begging is the real
problem in their positions. But H has heard, falsely, that question begging is a fallacy,
and he has heard that if he doesn’t like a premise and wishes it would just go away, then
that alone makes the premise question begging. So, in desperation he accuses his
opponent of the fallacy of question begging, and hastily and with great relief escapes
from Stage 2.
His opponent treats him in the same cavalier fashion and escapes in the same way.
In sum, in Stage 2, they do nothing except make noise.
So as we move to Stage 3, the dialectical situation is unchanged; only the first
premise is established. At this stage, the debaters are to step back and evaluate the
dialectical situation; each deciding which of their positions is more probably right.
6
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Suppose H now wants to argue, falsely, that his position is established. He tries to
show that his conclusion is established dialectically by deriving it from his premises. He
argues: “It is established that if there are changes there are true contradictions. But
obviously, there is change! So it is established as I’ve said all along, that there are true
contradictions.”
Here H repeats his original argument but for a new purpose. He is now not
entitled to that second premise which is now question begging. But this question begging
is a fallacy, since the premise is obvious, so established 1, though not established 2. And
this question begging is interesting. The premise is not question begging merely because
P disagrees with it, but because the balance of appearances is not clearly in its favor;
there is lack of justification 2.
But note: There is still no question begging in H’s argument if given for its
original, Stage 1 purpose, namely as an intended proof 1. The only fault there is still in
the first premise.
That’s my solution to Ritola’s problem.
BACKGROUND 7
I shall here give my own view on question begging and in the actual comment I shall
discuss the so-called irresolvable conflicts.
Fallacy theory began with Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations. A fallacy or
sophism is an argument that is not demonstrative though it appears to be so. So with
demonstrativeness as the goodness in question, a fallacy is a bad argument that appears
good. There are two factors: badness and apparent goodness.
Now Aristotle makes a blunder of major proportions, as pointed out by Hamblin. 8
His list of fallacies has two parts. In one part he lists the various ways a bad
argument might be made to appear good, the various types of ambiguity. In the other part
he lists various badnesses an argument might have. Here we find various invalidities, plus
question begging, irrelevant conclusion, and redundant premise. I shall ignore redundant
premise; we have invalidity, question begging, and irrelevant conclusion.
But surely then every true fallacy or sophism must be on both sides of the list. It
can’t be, as Aristotle says, that we have here two kinds of fallacy, as if there were on one
side the fallacies that appear good and on the other the fallacies that are bad! But surely
every real fallacy must be on both sides.
Notice then that every fallacy involves, on this understanding, an ambiguity, by
which its badness is disguised. So Aristotle to this extent agrees with my own view, the
One Fallacy Theory, according to which the only fallacy is the fallacy of playing with an
ambiguity.
In a typical fallacy then we want to go from some premises to a conclusion. This
inference is the intended argument, the principle argument of the fallacy. To make the
argument appear valid, we express it ambiguously so that the formulation has the
principle argument as one reading but also has other valid readings, and so the principle
argument appears to be valid, and the valid readings appear to be the intended argument.
7
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If we look at one of the valid readings, it turns out to differ from the intended
argument. If its premise is different, that premise is question begging; it’s not one of the
given premises. If the conclusion is different, we have irrelevant conclusion.
I take this account of question begging to be the only authentic idea of question
begging. 9
Note that in this account the invalid primary argument is not itself a fallacy. It’s
fallacious if you will, but it’s not a fallacy until it’s covered up by the ambiguities.
Similarly the question begging argument or the irrelevant conclusion argument are not
fallacies; they are just, if clearly stated, clearly different from the intended argument and
so are markedly faulty and not yet fallacies.
Nextly, on this account, the property of question begging is very dependent; there
is no question begging unless a primary argument is specified.
But Aristotle’s blunder presents his list as if the two parts are independent and the
badness on the one side are fallacies in their own right and question begging isn’t
dependent.
Yet question begging is clearly the fault of using a premise which isn’t given as
one to be argued from. So in looking for an independent idea of this we find ourselves
asking, “What premises should we argue from?” And various possibilities arise. If I am
forming an opinion, I argue from things I believe. IF I believe something but wish to be
surer, I argue from things I am sure about. If I want to cause some audience to know
something, I argue from things they already know. If I want to sell them something by
hook or by crook, I argue from things they believe, even if I think they are false. If I want
to refute a theory by reductio, I argue from statements of that theory. If I want to cite an
authority as an ally, I argue from statements of that authority. Or some teacher may just
assign a class of statements to be argued from.
But people want a more substantive, less relative, idea. So they ask, “What do we usually
or most importantly want to argue from?” And this leads to different theories of what
question begging “really” is. Aristotle himself thought the main use of argument was to
lead to new knowledge, and that knowledge was given by proof. So we should argue
from self evident statements. This leads to the logical idea of question begging. Ritola
calls this the objective epistemic idea. He finds it in Biro and Seigel 10 and raises
difficulties for it. In one of my earlier papers11 I find it in Aristotle’s Prior Analytics and
raise the same difficulties that Ritola rightly finds. Of the substantive notion, this is the
most authentically Aristotelean, since Aristotle himself tries to develop it, and I think it
would be of especial interest to have a viable theory of this sort of question begging.
Still it is rather stiff. If we shake it a bit to loosen it up and make it more flexible,
we get the epistemic or subjective epistemic idea, which Ritola finds in David Sanford 12
and Walter Sinnot-Armstrong. 13 This motion is still fairly Aristotelean, for it also sees
argument as trying to reach knowledge or justified belief, though it surrenders the idea
9
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that all knowledge is from proof. Still, Ritola, shows there are similar difficulties in this
approach as in the logical one.
Furthest from Aristotle is the dialectical approach, where we argue from the mere
opinions of an audience or an opponent. I believe the third approach discussed by Ritola
is a variant of this. This approach is very far from Aristotle. Aristotle does indeed have
the idea of a dialectical argument, an argument from the opinions of an audience. But this
sort of argument is not dear to Aristotle’s heart. Nor is it to mine, or to Ritola ( more on
this in the paper).
Concerning these substantive ideas of question begging, we may note two points.
None of them is really the authentic idea, which is the dependent or possibly the relative
one, though the logical one is clearly pushed by Aristotle, and, at the other end, the
dialectical is close to the relative one.
Second, in none of the substantive theories is question begging a fallacy in the full
sense. It is a fault in reasoning, since there is arguing from a premise you’re not supposed
to be arguing from, and in that loose sense it is of course a “fallacy.” But question
begging in itself is a badness only, with no appearance of goodness.
link to paper
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